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Madame, Monsieur , 
Bruxelles, le  .1\--\  / -1-1  /  ~  ~ 
LV/ 
Comme suite a votre demande,  je vous prie de  bien vouloir trouver ci-apres une copie de 
l'etude du BCG intitulee " The evolving competitive challenge for the european automotive 
industry " qui constitue, en fait, une mise a  jour de celle que le BCG a effectuee en 1990 pour Ia 
Commission sur l'industrie des composants automobiles dans le contexte du marche unique. 
J 
II  s'agit  Ia  d'une  etude  dont  les  conclusions  ne  sont  pas  entierement  partagees  par  Ia  I  Commission qui estime que  revaluation faite par le  BCG  de 400.000 pertes d'emplois  a 
l'horizon 2000 dans l'industrie communautaire des equipements automobiles est contestable. 
La  Commission  est  d'avis,  tout  comme  le  BCG,  que  le  niveau  actuel  de  productivite  de 
l'industrie europeenne des composants est nettement inferieur a  celui de l'industrie japonaise et 
qu'une restructuration importante doit encore avoir lieu afin d'ameliorer le  niveau global de 
competitivite du secteur. 
II 
La Commission considere toutefois que le  gap de  productivite indique par le  BCG dans son 
etude  et  l'effort  de  rattrapage  qui  en  decoule  ont  ete  surevalues  pour  des  raisons 
methodologiques. 
D'autres etudes indiquent un  gap de competitivite de l'industrie europeenne des composants 
nettement inferieur a  celui mis en evidence par le BCG1• 
La Commission a transmis l'etude a l'association europeenne des constructeurs (ACEA)  ainsi 
qu'a.l'association des equipementiers ( CLEPA) afin d'obtenir leur avis sur cette question.  Le 
CLEPA a deja fait savoir qu'il contestait, tout comme Ia Commission, les estimations du BCG. 
Je vous prie d'agreer l'expression de  mes salutations distinguees. 
Chef  d'unite 
1Ainsi,  "The Intelligence Economist Unit"  a estime, debut 1993, que le gap par rapport aux 
Japonais en terme de c011t global de production variait entre 13 et 24%. 
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The value of  production of  the EC independent components industry in 1992 was ECU 
93bn, with value added of  ECU 40bn.  Employment of 940,000 represented only a 
marginal increase over 1988, as an increase of production over the period of 15% was 
counterbalanced by a similar increase in productivity. 
Profitability levels of  both component and vehicle manufacturers in the EC have declined 
since 1988, although original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) continue to be more 
profitable than component producers, in contrast to the situation in Japan where returns 
are similar in both parts of the chain reflecting their close partnership. 
In both productivity and stock turns the EC components industry only achieves one third 
the Japanese level and this alarming gap has not changed over the last few years.  This 
competitive disadvantage versus the Japanese is significantly greater in components than 
in OEMs; Japanese vehicle productivity is now only 30% higher than European OEMs. 
Employment is likely to decline by at least 40% up to 1999, or by over 400,000 jobs in 
component production.  This represents a 50% convergence to current Japanese 
productivity levels, which is the absolute minimum for the industry to be viable after 
1999. 
The vehicle manufacturers are beginning to implement fundamental changes in their 
relationships with suppliers, including 
increased outsourcing 
divestiture of  their component subsidiaries 
single sourcing 
purchasing of  complete systems or sub-assemblies 
increasing delegation of design to suppliers. 
One of  the most significant actions is the reduction in the number of  direct suppliers, from 
around 1250 on average in 1988, to 900 currently, with plans to reduce to around 400 by 
1997. 
•  The structure of  the EC components industry is likely to change radically, with a clear 
movement to a tiered structure similar to that in Japan.  A concentration of first tier 
suppliers to around 500 principal ones in Europe is probable, with only 2-6 main 
competitors in the EC for most key subsystems.  The number of  companies operating as 
second or third tier suppliers may reduce by up to a third. 
•  First tier suppliers will need to develop their own supply chain management capabilities. 
Their effectiveness at this largely new role will be critical for the overall competitiveness 
of the European automotive industry.  The second tier suppliers, often small and medium 
enterprises, are the part of the overall chain where lies the greatest challenge to improve 
productivity and where awareness of means to improve competitiveness is least 
advanced. 
•  EC support in training, employment measures, harmonisation of standards (for quality 
certification, EDI, and if possible CAD/CAM), support for R&D and new product 
development and education on improved manufacturing processes can all play a useful 
role in assisting the industry to improve its competitiveness. 
•  Although the individual companies in the industry need to undertake major restructuring 
to enhance their competitiveness, it will be equally important to improve the relationships 
between OEMs and first tier component producers, and between the latter and their 
suppliers.  The realisation of true partnership relationships along the value chain is 
3 perhaps the critical challenge to create a viable and strong European automotive industry 
by the end of the decade. 
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5 1.  INTRODUCTION  AND  OBJECTIVES 
This study examines the size, competitiveness and main trends affecting the EC automotive 
components industry in order to assess the recent evolution of the main parameters and 
develop guidelines for improving the competitive position of the European industry.  The 
study is an update of the report on "The Competitive Challenge Facing the European 
Automotive Components Industry", presented to the Commission of the European 
Communities - Directorate General for Internal Market and Industrial Affairs in February 
1991. 
The study covers the following main aspects: 
•  Sizing of  the EC automotive components sector demand and supply; 
•  Analysis of financial performance and key indicators of competitiveness of 
components manufacturers and original equipment manufacturers (OEMs); 
•  Analysis of key industry trends and changes in the GEM-components 
suppliers relationship; 
•  Implications for EC policies. 
The study investigated components for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles (below 
3.5 tonnes) and covered both original and replacement equipment.  Product groups covered 
were: fuel system, cooling system, internal engine components, exhaust system, 
transmission and other drivetrain, suspension, steering, body and external parts, interior 
trim, brakes and electrical componentry.  Products specifically excluded from the study were 
paint, adhesives, fasteners, communications equipment, tyres, unfinished components and 
materials,  accessories and care products. 
The geographical scope includes all the EC countries and takes into account the impact of 
unification on the German industry. 
The analysis of the different trends and its implications for EC policies are based on an 
extensive face-to-face interview programme, consisting of over 50 interviews carried out in 
the second quarter of 1993.  These included interviews with major European vehicle 
manufacturers, Japanese transplants, different types of component producers in the EC (by 
subsector, size, and country), and CLEPA officials and member industry associations. 
The update on the industry size estimates and financial analysis was based on an improved 
and more precise version of the model used in the previous study.  Changes in the model 
(e.g. in calculating the replacement market in each country), are described in more detail 
when discussing specific results. 
The following sections describe the main findings and conclusions of the study. 
***** 
1 2.  INDUSTRY  SIZING 
2.1.  Methodology 
As stated in the 1991 report, the existing published statistics relating to the size of the EC 
automotive components industry present a variety of  problems, including incomplete 
coverage, double counting, inconsistent segmentation country by country and widely 
differing estimates of the replacement market. Moreover, the sizing of the industry using 
existing statistics has several major drawbacks: in the first place, there is not an accepted 
definition of  the industry; secondly, component producers are often part of  larger companies 
operating in several industries, making it difficult to separate out their component activities. 
Given such problems, a specific methodology was developed in the earlier study for 
quantifying and forecasting component consumption, production, value-added and 
employment. The chart below outlines schematically the approach taken in determining the 
size of the industry. 
INDUSTRY  SIZING 
Outline  Methodology 
Car and light commercial vehicle (LCV) production values are based on production volume 
and price data. Component demand for original equipment (OE demand) was estimated from 
vehicle production value using information about levels of vertical integration and detailed 
production cost structures obtained from annual reports and vehicle manufacturer interviews. 
Replacement component demand is very well documented in the United Kingdom, but not in 
other EC countries.  Demand in other EC countries was modeled by adjusting for country 
differences in pare size, pare age structure, average annual mileage, accident rates, and the 
strictness of  compulsory vehicle testing. Replacement component demand is principally 
affected by number of accidents, testing requirements and mileage driven. 
Production, value added and employment were calculated from total component consumption 
using EC trade data, value added statistics and labour productivity. 
Following suggestions from CLEP  A and industry experts, a number of improvements have 
been made in 1993 to the sizing methodology: car pare age profiles have been more accurately 
modeled for the replacement component market; detailed discussions have been held with 
insurance companies to assess accident spending; finally, a detailed value segmentation of car 
markets by model type has been incorporated. 
2 The approach taken to forecast industry growth is the same as that in the 1991 report. 
Original equipment demand was derived from vehicle production forecasts and predictions 
about changes in vehicle manufacturers' level of vertical integration obtained from interviews. 
Replacement component demand was calculated from forecast pare growth and assumptions 
about changes in components durability and convergence in vehicle testing requirements and 
accident frequencies across EC countries. Production and employment forecasts were 
estimated from consumption forecasts using trade balance and labour productivity growth 
projections and assumptions. 
The information given for 1988 for comparative purposes differs slightly from that which 
was given in the 1991 report, due to the adjustments and improvements to various aspects of 
the model, including pricing and productivity data.  The net result of these changes is to 
reduce the estimate of 1988 overall EC employment by 2.3%. 
2.2.  Current Industry Size 
The European independent component industry accounted in 1992 for ECU 93 billion in 
production, ECU 40 billion in value added and currently employs around 940,000 people. 
The importance of the different key countries is also shown below. 
INDUSTRY  SIZING  - 1992 
The production at vehicle manufacturers (including assembly and key components like 
engines and transmissions) is twice the size at ECU 186 billion, with value added at ECU 65 
billion, and employment slightly higher at 1,025,000 people.  The higher level of value 
added, given only a slight difference in employment, is explained by better productivity in the 
vehicle assembly sector, as will be discussed later. 
2.2.1. Consumption 
Total EC component consumption is estimated at ECU 88.8 Bn in 1992.  This represents an 
important increase from the 1988 market, which was estimated at ECU 73.4 Bn, and is 
equivalent to a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 4.9% in nominal terms.  The top 
five countries represent 95% of total consumption, with Germany alone accounting for 44%. 
TOTAL COMPONENT DEMAND  - 1992 
3 The original equipment market (OEM) which represents 77% of the total has gone from 
ECU 57 Bn to ECU 68 Bn.  As shown in the figure below, Germany is the most important 
market which represents 50% of the total followed by France (20% ), the UK, Italy and Spain 
each with aproximately 10% . This mainly reflects the geographical location of vehicle 
manufacturers.  Germany and Spain have shown particularly high growth rates. 
OEM DERIVED CONSUMPTION (ECU Bn) 
Germany  24.7  34.3  39% 
France  11.8  12.2  3o/o 
UK  6.4  6.9  8% 
Italy  6.4  6.3  -2% 
Spain  4.8  6.5  36% 
Rest ofEC  2.4  2.0  -16% 
Total  56.5  68.2  21 o/o 
The rise in original equipment demand is due to a small increase in vehicle production, an 
increase in the outsourcing of  components by vehicle manufacturers, the use of more 
sophisticated components in vehicles, and a shift to the production of higher value vehicles. 
The latter effect is particularly noticeable in Germany, as can be seen in the graph below, and, 
to a lesser extent, in the UK. 
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The replacement market demand is now ECU 21 Bn compared with ECU 17 Bn in 1988, 
representing a growth of 4.6% CAGR in nominal terms.  Demand stemming from mileage-
related repair is the major driver of the replacement market, accounting for 71% of  the total at 
the European level.  Accident related repairs account for 22% of  the total, with vehicle testing 
responsible for only 7%.  There are significant differences country by country, with for 
example, test related expenditure highest in southern European countries. 
Even though the replacement component demand in unit terms has decreased as a result of 
higher quality and reliability of vehicles and a decrease in the number of accidents due to 
better road infrastructure, the replacement market has remained level at 23% of the total 
market in value  terms.  This is a result of increases in the prices of replacement components, 
whereas prices of components supplied to OEMs have remained more or less constant. 
If we analyse the total market by component type, we can observe that the most important 
component groups are body parts (20%), interior trim (15%), electrical (14%) and internal 
engine (12%).  Compared with 1988, there has been an increasing importance of body and 
external parts and interior equipment.  The greater importance of electronics is not fully 
4 shown in the figure as many of the improvements and additions in electronics are considered 
within other component type categories (e.g. interior equipment). 
TOTAL MARKET SIZE  BY  COMPONENT TYPE 
•  Fuel systems  3.9  4.4 
•  Internal engine  10.3  11.6 
•  Engine cooling  1.9  2.1 
•  Exhaust system  4.3  4.8 
•  Transmission  3.5  3.9 
•  Other drive train  4.7  5.3 
•  Suspension  2.6  2.9 
•  Steering  2.2  2.5 
•  Body/external parts  17.7  20.0 
•  Interior equipment  13.2  14.9 
•  Brakes  6.6  7.5 
•  Wheels  5.3  5.9 
•  Electrical  12.6  14.2 
Total  88.8  100.0 
2.2.2. Production 
Total EC component production is estimated at ECU 92. 7 Bn representing an increase on the 
1988 estimate which was ECU 81 Bn, or a 3.5% CAGR in nominal terms.  The increase in 
production has been particularly important  in Spain and UK with growth rates of 6.2% and 
5.7% CAGR respectively.  Germany still represents the most important production base in 
Europe with 47% of the total. 
COMPONENT PRODUCTION 
1992 
Germany  43.6  47 
France  18.0  19 
UK  10.8  12 
Italy  10.2  11 
Spain  6.9  7 
Rest ofEC  3.2  4 
Total  92.7  100 
The distribution of  production across Europe is likely to change in the future as a result of 
vehicle plant investments, europeanisation of purchasing and changes in the competitiveness 
of different suppliers within the EC, as shall be discussed in later sections of the report. 
5 2.2.3. Employment 
Employment in the components industry has increased marginally from 1988 to 1992.  The 
15% increase in total production over the period has been counterbalanced by an increase of 
13% in labour productivity measured in terms of sales per employee.  This reflects the 
improvements in efficiency achieved by component manufacturers under pressure from 
increasingly demanding vehicle manufacturers' purchasing practices. 
PRODUCTION AND  EMPLOYMENT 
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In Germany and the UK, the increase in production has outweighed productivity increases, 
hence employment has increased.  In France and Spain, however, increases in production 
have not been sufficient to offset large productivity gains, so employment has decreased. 
The largest drop in employment is seen in Italy, as a result of the decrease in production and 
restructuring measures taken to increase productivity.  This is summarised below. 
PRODUCTION AND  PRODUCTIVITY EVOLUTION BY  COUNTRY 
1988  - 1992 
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389  436 
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As discussed later in the section on financial performance, there is still much scope for 
productivity improvement relative to the Japanese component manufacturers.  Increases in 
productivity to date appear to have been made by increasing sales with constant employment 
rather than by reducing employment at an industry level. 
2.3.  Forecast 
The approach taken to forecasting industry growth is the same as that in the 1991 study.  OE 
demand was derived from DRI vehicle production forecasts, and estimates of manufacturers' 
levels of future outsourcing obtained from interviews.  Replacement market demand was 
calculated from forecast pare growth, assumptions about changes in component durability, 
and predicted convergence in vehicle testing requirements and accident levels across the EC. 
1992 RE 
market 
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COMPONENT MARKET FORECAST 
Methodology 
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The original equipment market (OE) is forecast to increase in overall size, with growth in 
production volume, value mix, car component content and volume of outsourcing by OEMs 
outweighing the component price reduction currently being achieved by OEMs.  The 
replacement market (RE) is expected to remain virtually level in real terms, with increases in 
7 vehicle testing related demand compensating for decreases in mileage-related and accident-
related demand due to improved quality and reliability. 
German  34.3 
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5.0  5.0  39.4  35.5 
3.8  3.4  15.9  16.8 
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3.1  3.3  9.4  10.9 
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Employment is likely to decline dramatically in the future, as the growth of consumption 
and production slows down and the rate of productivity increase by necessity accelerates. 
The chart below indicates the level of  employment in 1999, the date that the "Elements of 
Consensus" agreement with Japan governing imports expires, under different assumptions 
about productivity. 
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(%)  (%) 
-11%  4% 
·43%  12% 
-54%  14% 
At the rate of productivity growth (in value-added per employee) of the last several years of 
4% per annum, employment would only be reduced by 11%.  However, this level of 
productivity growth would leave the industry hopelessly unviable at the end of the period and 
in danger of collapse.  If the European components industry were to reach in 
1999,  the level  of productivity of the Japanese industry in  1992,  then 
employment would  be reduced by 54%, implying a  14%  per annum 
improvement.  As will be discussed later, it is highly likely that the Japanese will continue 
to increase their productivity at the 5-6% pa steady rate of the last decade.  Therefore, even 
such a drastic employment reduction in the EC would not guarantee reaching parity with the 
Japanese industry.  Assuming only a 50% convergence by the EC industry in 1999 to the 
Japanese levels of 1992, would still imply an employment reduction of over 40%. 
8 The very large employment reductions announced by many EC component producers during 
the first half of 1993 are the beginning of this process of radical restructuring.  The recent 
demands by several leading European OEMs for cost and price reductions from their 
suppliers of over 10% pa indicate the seriousness of the pressures that will be brought to bear 
on the components industry to improve its productivity. 
BCG believes that the 50% convergence scenario is the absolute minimum necessary for the 
industry to be in a position to survive after 1999.  The likely decrease of  direct employment in 
the independent components industry of over 400,000 will imply the need for retraining of 
the displaced workers to  help them find alternative employment, and training for those 
employed to give them the skills needed to achieve the much higher level of output per man. 
Implications for possible EC policies to deal with these issues are discussed later in this 
report. 
3.  FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE 
The financial analysis was based on a representative sample of  component suppliers. Several 
data sources such as ICC in the UK, DAFNE in Germany, Value Line in the USA, FIEV and 
SESSI in France, and JAPIA in Japan were used.  The component supplier sample was 
composed mainly of first tier suppliers representing the different sub-sectors of the industry. 
Data for different years was deflated using country specific deflators and then converted to 
ECU using 1992 exchange rates. 
3.1.  Component  manufacturers 
In measuring financial performance, the study had two main objectives. The first one was to 
understand the profitability of the European industry relative to the Japanese and US 
industries and its recent evolution. The second one was to analyse different parameters of 
financial performance, such as labour productivity and stock turns, which permit an 
understanding of the competitiveness of the European industry at an aggregate level. 
3 .1.1. Profitability 
The profitability of European component manufacturers has been decreasing in the 1988-91 
period particularly in the UK and France.  This reflects the slowdown in demand, increases 
in capacity, reduction in prices and the fierce competition that is accompanying the sector 
restructuring. The decreasing profitability, which affects also US and Japanese 
manufacturers, appears to be converging to aproximately 10% measured in terms of Return 
on Net Assets (RONA) and to roughly 5% Return on Sales (ROS) over the cycle. 
OPERATING PROFIT 
20 
18 
16 
14 
Operating 
12 
profit/sales*  10 
(o/o)  8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
*Profit before interest, taxes and extraordinary items and non-trading items 
Source: ICC, FIEV, DAFNE, JAPIA, Value Line 
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1990  1991 In 1988, RONA was as high as 17% in the US and 15% in the UK. In Germany, on the 
contrary, it has increased significantly from around 4% in 1987 to 8% in 1991, probably due 
to the boost induced by the process of unification; since then, however, profitability has 
declined as a result of the recession.  Italy and Spain have been excluded due to lack of 
publicly available data, although representative interviews carried out in Spain indicate that 
returns in that country have also decreased, following the general trend in the European 
sector, from around 15% in 1987 to 4% in 1992. 
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It  is important to point out that even though European manufacturers' cash flow as a 
proportion of sales is approaching Japanese levels, the Japanese component manufacturers 
cash flow has been remarkably stable at around 7% of  sales. This is the result of a non-
confrontational supply chain management, where prices are set on a "cost-plus"basis and 
costs managed down every year. This stability of  cash flows helps Japanese manufacturers to 
plan long term investments. A proof that the system is still different in Europe is the fact that 
as soon as vehicle demand decreases, the cash flow of  component manufacturers is affected 
significantly. 
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Germany 3.1.2. Productivity indicators 
Competitiveness was analysed by looking at key overall indicators, such as labour 
productivity and stock turnover. Both measures are correlated and are key drivers of 
operational competitiveness. The figure below shows the correlation of both drivers. Japan 
excels in both dimensions whereas European manufacturers have ratios similar to US 
companies. 
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Labour productivity measured in terms of sales per employee in Europe appears to be 
growing slowly in real terms.  The Japanese labour productivity, however, has been steadily 
increasing at a growth rate of 5.6% per annum. 
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To compare productivity between the various countries it is important to take currency effects 
into account.  This shows that the movements in value of the Yen have limited the ability of 
Japan to pull away from the EC. 
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If we analyse productivity in terms of value added per employee, the Japanese 
industry is again seen to be improving faster than the EC. (Value-added data is only available 
for France and Germany).  However, as mentioned before, currency effects have in fact 
largely compensated for this gap in growth. 
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On stock turnover (sales I materials, work in progress and finished goods stock), another 
key measure of competitiveness, Japan has successfully maintained its lead but appears no 
longer to be increasing it. During the 1987-1990 period, average stock tum in Japan has 
decreased 2.9% CAGR.  This may reflect the fact that Japan has reached a "plateau" in its 
efficiency improvement.  It could also be due to the excess of variety of both cars and 
components, which the Japanese are already cutting back, as we will discuss later. 
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12 Although European component producers have focused efforts in this area and have 
succeeded in improving stock turns, they are still on average at only 5-7 stock turns 
compared with nearly 19 turns for Japanese companies. UK and German companies have 
improved significantly at 4.6% and 3.2% CAGR, respectively. Interviews of larger 
component companies show that these often have stock turns of around 12-15X. That implies 
that the average of  European companies is affected by the presence of many low performing 
manufacturers. 
Stock turnover is a crucial measure because it reflects the adoption of  just-in-time delivery 
systems and the increasing degree of adoption of lean manufacturing processes. 
Labour costs per employee in Europe are lower than in Japan, but there are still 
important differences across European countries that show little sign of  narrowing. 
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On an hourly basis the gap between European countries and Japan is less, with German costs 
equivalent to those in Japan. The UK industry has the only significantly increasing labour 
costs among the EC countries, but the levels remain far below those in France and Germany. 
The Japanese figures may be slightly overstated as the Japanese third tier suppliers reportedly 
have costs around 113 lower than the first tier suppliers, whereas in Europe they are only 
20% lower on average. This is another source of competitive advantage for the Japanese 
industry. 
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If we analyse labour costs as a percentage of sales, the situation changes completely, 
reflecting the higher productivity of the Japanese industry and the slightly higher levels of 
outsourcing. Whereas in Japan the ratio is around 17%, in Germany it is over twice as large 
at 35%. France has show an impressive improvement over the last five years or so. 
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As opposed to the OEMs, the outsourcing levels of first tier component producers are 
quite similar in Japan to those in Europe.  The French numbers indicate a high level of 
outsourcing by the larger component companies. 
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The components industry is in general relatively capital intensive but an important finding is 
that European asset intensity is high compared to the Japanese and, to a lesser extent, to the 
US. This reflects the higher stock levels of the European component manufacturers, but also 
heavy fixed asset investment. The latter is a consequence of high levels of investment in 
automation, which have not led to higher productivity levels. 
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3.2.1. Profitability 
Operating margins are low in all countries for vehicle manufacturers. Results have ranged 
from -3% in the case of UK-based OEMs to 3% in the case of Spanish-based manufacturers. 
These are the results for the car business only, other operations being removed from the 
calculations. 
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In all cases the margins have been declining since 1989, showing the crisis affecting the 
industry, as a result of the drop in demand and overcapacity. 
As we saw with component suppliers, the Japanese OEMs profitability ratios have remained 
remarkably steady during the 1982-1992 period: cash-flow around 6%, RONA around 10%, 
and ROS around 5%.  On the contrary, European OEMs have seen their profitability decline 
sharply in terms of operating profit (from 7% to -3% in the UK during the period 1988-91), 
ROS (from 14% to 7% in France, 1987-91) and RONA (from 28% to 20% in Spain, 1987-
91).  The same is true of US vehicle manufacturers. 
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In particular, Japanese OEMs' cash flow has remained stable at 6% of sales during the period 
1984-91, while their European and American competitors have seen cash flow decline 
significantly, as the chart below shows. 
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3.2.2. Productivity indicators 
As stated in the 1991 report, the productivity gap of  European OEMs compared with their 
Japanese counterparts is very important.  The new analysis shows that the most significant 
progress in productivity has been made by French vehicle manufacturers, with sales per 
employee in real terms growing at 7.0% per annum. 
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Moreover, sales per employee are higher in Japan than in Europe and the US due to the 
higher level of subcontracting of the Japanese industry. As we can see in the graph below, 
European OEM value added as a percentage of sales is significantly higher than Japan's, 
reflecting lower outsourcing to independent component producers. In any case Japan 
seems to have attained the maximum level of subcontracting possible in this industry, around 
85%, although in some specific models (like in the Honda Today, sold only in Japan) it can 
represent up to 90% of the cost of the car. 
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If we measure productivity in terms of value added per employee, then we can see how 
several European countries, especially France, have attained Japanese levels. The lowest 
productivities in Europe correspond to Italy and the UK. Spain has experienced the largest 
improvement, with a 4.6% CAGR in the period 1987-91. This evolution is the result of the 
efforts carried out by Spanish based OEMs to increase plant automation and reduce the 
workforce. 
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Japanese labour costs account for a significantly lower proportion of sales than European 
labour costs  (112 to 113less), although there is a significant amount of variation within 
Europe.  Spain and France have improved more than manufacturers located in Germany and 
Italy.  Again the figures in Japan have remained nearly constant over the past ten years at 8%, 
and there is not much competitive leverage to be gained by the Japanese in further 
productivity increases beyond offsetting increases in real wages. 
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Stock turns have slightly declined in Japanese OEMs during the period 1987-91 (-0.6% 
CAGR) leveling at 21x, while from 1983 to 1987 they had grown at a 2.8% CAGR. 
European producers' stock turns range from 7x in the UK to 14x in France, but are still far 
from Japanese levels. Once again, Spanish-based manufacturers have obtained the highest 
improvement, reaching 12x in 1991. This is due to the progressive introduction of JIT 
techniques by Spanish factories during the period and relatively focused product lines. 
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American and Italian OEMs have a much higher asset intensity than the Japanese and other 
European manufacturers. Efforts to improve productivity by plant automation have not 
brought the results expected in the USA and Italy. 
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19 3.3.  Comparison of OEMs  and component suppliers 
The comparison of the financial performance of  both car manufacturers and component 
suppliers is useful in order to know whether a real optimisation of  profitability and 
productivity is taking place within the whole value chain. 
3.3.1. Profitability 
The similar financial results of  Japanese OEMs and their suppliers in the 1991 report suggest 
a high degree of  cooperation between them. Improvements in performance are pursued 
together and increases and reductions in profitability over the cycle shared equally. 
The updated figures below shows again how in Japan profitability levels between OEMs and 
suppliers move together, while they are dissimilar in the US and Europe. While RONA of 
component manufacturers is currently higher than that of  OEMs in the US, it is significantly 
lower in Europe. This might be explained by two factors: the special problems that American 
OEMs have had with the increasing Japanese presence in their main market, on the one hand, 
and the traditional confrontational system between European OEMs and component 
producers, on the other hand. 
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In terms of cash flow, Japanese component manufacturers and OEMs show a very stable 
evolution, with ratios of around 6% during the period 1982-90. Since the mid-1980s 
Japanese OEMs have seen their cash flow decrease somewhat as a consequence of the large 
investments they made during the 1980s in transplant production in the US and then Europe. 
In contrast cash flow in Europe and the US has been very unstable, varying according to the 
cyclical fluctuations of the car market. Again, the OEMs' cash flow has been traditionally 
higher than that of  component makers, although in recent years the gap seems to have 
decreased, both in Europe and  especially in the US. The recession seems to have hit OEMs 
harder than component producers. 
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3.3.2. Productivity 
Measured in terms of sales per employee, both OEMs and component manufacturers in 
Europe show large productivity disadvantages compared to Japan. 
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To compare OEMs against component manufacturers, it is better to examine value added per 
employee (for reasons discussed in 3.2.2.).  This shows that the competitive gap 
versus the Japanese is  significantly greater in components than in OEMs: 
Japanese productivity is  30%  higher in OEMs but around 2.5  times greater in 
components. 
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Comparing stock turns performance, two main points must be highlighted. In the first 
place, Japanese performance is again higher than that in Europe or the US - a logical 
consequence of the greater implementation of "lean production" and JIT techniques in Japan. 
Secondly, stock turns of OEMs are significantly higher than those of component producers in 
Europe and the US, in part reflecting the displacement of  stock from OEMs to component 
producers through the requirement that the latter hold buffer stocks next to the factory. 
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3.4.  Competitiveness 
The 1991 study suggested that in order to close the competitive gap between the European 
automotive industry and the Japanese: 
•  "It is imperative that European automotive component and vehicle producers 
effectively adopt modem flexible manufacturing and new product development 
processes"; 
•  "There is a compelling need for structural change in the components industry 
"·  ...  ' 
22 •  "  ... And for fundamental changes in the GEM-supplier relationship towards 
partnership". 
European vehicle manufacturers have in the past three years begun to focus their efforts on 
improving their competitiveness in costs, quality and time by implementing effective design 
and development processes and flexible and reliable assembly processes.  Therefore, they are 
following the challenges set by the Japanese industry and have begun to introduce new 
dimensions in the management of the supply chain like: black box design, JIT processes, and 
increased outsourcing.  Nevertheless, the analysis of productivity and stock turns suggests 
that improvement is still needed and the gap with Japan remains large. 
European component manufacturers lag even further behind Japanese in terms of  labour 
productivity, measured in terms of both sales and value added per employee.  This gap is 
significantly greater than in the OEM industry, where Europe appears to be successfully 
catching up with Japan.  The other key indicator of operational effectiveness, stock turns, 
demonstrates that the European component industry also lags well behind Japan in the 
implementation of more advanced production technologies.  In both productivity and 
stock turns the EC components industry only  achieves  one-third the Japanese 
level  and this alarming gap has not closed  over the last few  years. 
While the European automotive industry struggles to catch up along the well established 
competitive dimensions set by the Japanese, there is increasing evidence that the Japanese 
automotive industry is rethinking its strategies for the future.  This may gradually change the 
demands placed on the European industry to maintain its competitiveness in the future. 
Japanese development and basis of competitive advantage was founded on: product cost and 
quality, short model cycles and product variety, whereas European advantages were based 
more on: engineering excellence, brand values and long model lives. 
Japanese new product variety reached a peak by 1991. Nissan, for example, had 29 basic 
models and 2,200 variations of models: the Laurel model was offered with 86 types of 
steering wheel and 173 types of steering columns, and Mazda offered 4,000 permutations of 
cars. Toyota had advanced its pace of product innovation to one distinct new vehicle every 10 
months. 
The "variety wars" of the late 1980s/early 1990s by Japanese producers, particularly in their 
home market, impeded cost reduction and put pressure on profitability. The Japanese 
industry went too far in their search for variety assuming that the proliferation of models, 
features and specifications was a source of  competitive advantage. The result has been : 
•  Excess of  product variety, much of which was not valued and, in some cases, 
resented by the consumer; 
•  Limited production of  common parts between models; 
•  Extremely rapid new product introduction cycles; 
•  Overload even on very "lean" and flexible production systems. 
As a result Japanese automotive producers have recently announced major changes in their 
product policies. All the OEMs are aiming to cut the number of model variations: Nissan 
has announced cuts up to 50%, Toyota 30%, Mazda 30%, and Mitsubishi 20%. Another area 
where cost savings are being sought is by increasing the commonality of parts across 
different models. As a result, Nissan is aiming to cut by 40% the number of parts, Toyota 
expects a 35-45% cut  (e.g. from 11  to 6 varieties of the Corolla model) and Mazda 30% 
(e.g. 76less variations in its 929 model car). Finally, the model cycles are no longer being 
shortened, and most producers are stabilising them at  around 4 years. 
23 A paradigm shift appears to be taking place in the Japanese automotive industry. Profitability 
is replacing market share as the key objective. Variety as a strategy weapon is becoming 
played out. Increasingly faster new product introductions has been driving up costs, has 
created management complexity and has put strain on the distribution system. At the same 
time innovation has started to become a commodity not producing meaningful variety of value 
to the customer. 
During the last year or so Japanese OEMs are changing their strategic focus: 
•  Reducing the number of models and variations; 
•  Extending product life cycles; 
•  Increasing parts commonality across models; 
•  Entering into cooperative agreements with competitors. 
All these actions will imply changes in the competitive challenge facing the European 
automotive industry. 
The previously alarming gap in new  product development speed  between 
Japan and Europe now look less threatening.  The best European automotive 
producers are reaching the development time of  four years that the Japanese now seem to be 
establishing as their new norm.  The rest should reach this goal within a few years.  The 
leading EC component companies are now capable of  rapid prototyping together with their 
OEM customers to meet the new product development cycle needs.  Similarly, European 
vehicle and component manufacturers are catching up in overcoming the quality gap, 
although efforts need to be continued in this area. 
On the other hand, the new Japanese strategies imply increased pressure on 
costs in the future.  Given the already very reduced levels of value-added of Japanese 
vehicle assemblers, their efforts will be concentrated on translating the reduced product 
complexity demands into lower costs through even tighter coordination of the supply chain. 
The European components industry, already the weak link in the European automotive 
industry's cost competitiveness today, will be under even greater pressure in the future. 
Unless drastic action is taken soon, the competitive gap in components risks widening even 
further.  Changes in structure, as well as the efforts of the individual companies themselves 
will play an important role in improving competitiveness. 
4.  THE CONCENTRATION OF THE INDUSTRY 
4.1.  Introduction 
The concentration of  the automotive component sector is one of the main structural changes 
that the industry is facing. It  is the result of two main driving forces: 
•  The lack of  competitiveness of  many suppliers in an extremely fragmented 
industry; 
•  The changes in the key dimensions of  competitiveness among vehicle 
manufacturers. 
The most important changes are being driven by the vehicle manufacturers, in an attempt to 
improve their cotnpetitiveness in an increasingly difficult market and competitive 
environment.  These are reflected in changes in their purchasing policies, namely: 
•  Increase in outsourcing; 
24 •  Single sourcing; 
•  Purchase of systems; 
•  Formation of strategic alliances for purchasing. 
As a result the number of component suppliers is being reduced and is leading to a different 
configuration of the industry: 
•  Higher subsector concentration; 
•  Tiering of supplier base; 
•  Changes in the value chain activities performed. 
This has implications not only for the structure and competitiveness of the industry but also 
for the GEM-component supplier relationship. As explained later, the capabilities required by 
first tier suppliers, second tier suppliers or commodity suppliers will be very different. 
4.2.  OEM  driven  changes 
4.2.1. Increase in outsourcing: 
The degree of outsourcing is critical in reducing management complexity and costs at the 
OEM level. The 1991 study showed a clear difference between Japanese and European car 
manufacturers. EC car manufacturers typically had a much higher degree of vertical 
integration than Japanese, particularly if  component divisions and subsidiaries were taken 
into account. 
Based on internal data provided by the companies, BCG estimates were that in 1990, on 
average, value added as a percentage of sales in European OEMs was 46% without 
component subsidiaries and 56% including them, while the Japanese OEMs were far less 
vertically integrated with only 36% of total value added. 
During the last three years the situation has clearly changed in Europe and the majority of 
OEMs have moved along two lines: 
•  Divesting their component subsidiaries; 
•  Increasing the level of outsourcing. 
Examples of divestitures by OEMs of  their component manufacturer subsidiaries are: Rover 
selling its fuel systems division to the Hoboum Group Ltd, and Llanelli Radiators to 
Calsonic, Fiat selling its Magnetti-Marelli Brakes subsidiary to Allied-Signal Automotive, 
PSA Group selling its small electric motors division to the Holding Henri Heulieg and GM 
selling a majority shareholding of  its seat belt and electronic component plant in Belfast to 
Takata. 
The result of this has been that, in 1992 according to the data provided by OEMs, the 
percentage of the ex-plant value of the vehicle production that is outsourced has significantly 
augmented ranging from 65% to 84%, the European average being 68%. In all the cases there 
has been an increase in the outsourcing of at least 5 points, even in the case of OEMs that 
have followed more restrictive outsourcing policies such as Mercedes Benz.  Outsourcing is 
defined as the proportion of a vehicle's ex-factory value which is accounted for by purchases 
of components and materials. 
The same trend has been followed in the US. GM in the US, for example, has gone from 
buying over 70% of  parts in-house in the early 1980s to 57% by 1992 and has announced 
further disposals of operations in GM's Automotive Components Group. 
25 4.2.2. Single sourcing: 
Whereas in the 1980s all EC vehicle manufacturers tended to use multiple sourcing, single 
sourcing is now increasingly being implemented for component systems and for the majority 
of "development components". 
The only components where multiple sourcing is still the norm are "commodity components". 
These include components like standard rubber tubes, nuts, bolts, fasteners, springs and 
other low value items that have the following characteristics: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
They are not jointly developed under a "black-box design"; 
They are unbranded; 
They do not affect  the safety of the vehicle; 
Investment in tools and equipment is reduced  . 
The objective of multiple sourcing, where several suppliers offer the same component per 
model, is to obtain cost efficiency through the direct competition  of suppliers. The main 
drawbacks of it are smaller production series, more complicated logistics and higher 
administrative costs. 
Single sourcing, as implemented in Europe, consists in having one component supplier per 
model.  Although, in the case of seats, single sourcing implies one supplier per assembly 
plant.  However, there are normally different manufacturers supplying the same type of 
component to different vehicle models of  the OEM. The objective is to obtain cost efficiency 
through greater volume, target costs and prices agreed jointly and early involvement of the 
supplier in design. 
Many Japanese OEMs have gone one step further and are applying the single sourcing 
concept to a family of  products and for all  the models of the OEM, thus creating a complete 
partnership between the OEM and its component supplier. The major drawback of such a 
complete single sourcing is the risk of depending on one supplier. For this reason, it is 
unlikely t~at many European OEMs will emulate the Japanese practice. 
The interviews indicate most European OEMs intend to implement single sourcing for key 
components over the next few years, although different suppliers will coexist for the same 
component used in different vehicle models.  From the point of view of the supplier this will 
imply a deeper relationship, a greater volume per component and a higher and earlier 
involvement in the design phase.  From the point of view of the OEM this will imply the 
possibility of  continuously reducing costs by working closely with a reduced number of 
suppliers.  Nevertheless, some component suppliers claim that as a result of the 
implementation of  single sourcing, competition between suppliers has become more fierce, 
thus eroding the margins. 
4.2.3. Systems purchasing: 
The purchase of complete systems or subsystems, rather than large numbers of individual 
components for final assembly by the OEM, is the characteristic pattern in the Japanese 
industry.  BCG's interviews indicate that European OEMs are now beginning to move in this 
direction as well.  The rationale behind this is to reduce the costs associated with complex 
management of purchasing and assembly of a series of  components. This is also a 
consequence of the implementation of black  -box design of systems by the component system 
supplier. 
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•  Fuel system: Fuel tank; 
•  Wheels system: Wheels and tyres; 
•  Interior equipment and trim systems: 
Seats and seat adjusting systems; 
dashboard and instruments clusters; 
•  Air conditioning system; 
•  Body and external parts systems: 
Front end; 
doors (panels, window power system, mirror and wiring); 
bumpers; 
sun roof; 
•  Suspension system: Shock-absorbers and springs; 
•  Brakes and axles system: Drums, discs servo unit and axles; 
•  Transmission system: Gearbox; 
•  Exhaust system: Exhaust pipe, silencer and catalyst; 
•  Engine systems: 
engine management (ignition + injection); 
engine internal components (piston and connecting rod); 
engine cooling system; 
electrical wiring. 
The implementation of systems purchasing varies between different OEMs as they have 
various degrees of  confidence with the concept and also because of their different make vs 
buy policies.  According to the interviews with European vehicle manufacturers, the different 
systems or subsystems/subassemblies can be ranked according to various levels of 
outsourcing: 
High 
Importance/ 
complexity 
Low 
• Brakes and axles  • 
• Internal engine 
components 
• Front end 
•  Suspension 
• Bumpers 
• Dashboard 
• Air conditioning 
Low 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Degree of 
outsourcing 
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Gearboxes 
Seats 
Sunroofs 
Exhaust system 
Electrical wiring 
Engine cooling 
Fuel tanks 
Wheels and tyres 
High Although all OEMs intend to move towards greater systems purchasing, the implementation 
of the concept varies  significantly. The degree of implementation depends in many cases on 
the design phase and is obviously greater in the case of new models. 
Although the trend is clear with wide acceptance in the industry, it is still at a very early stage, 
well behind the Japanese situation. As discussed later, the capabilities to be developed as a 
first tier supplier of  systems represent a significant change from the current situation. The 
speed of the full tiering process is limited by the willingness of OEMs to outsource the 
complete system or parts of them. 
Required 
supplier 
competence 
SUPPLIERS'  DEVELOPMENT  FOCUS 
-------
1985  1990  1995  2000 
Therefore we view the evolution in three steps as shown in the figure above. In the  first 
phase first tier suppliers have been focusing on enhancing their subsystems: building of 
competence through developing more sophisticated solutions and expanding their 
international presence in order to maintain global competitiveness in the subsystem. 
The second phase that has already started is based on the assembly logic that is shifting the 
limits of subsystems. There will be an increasing tendency to supply units which are ready 
for assembly . Suppliers of enhanced subsystems will have to build up material, process and 
assembly know-how as well as corresponding manufacturing and assembly capacities. 
Examples of areas moving in this direction are : a) preassembly of  complete 
shock absorbing legs (springs/shock absorbers) including suspension parts and brake disks 
(Delco), b) preassembly of complete axles and suspensions including steering parts 
(Benteler), c) preassembly of brakes including wheel suspension (Teves). 
The third phase will consist in the co-development of enhanced subsystems or complete 
system under the leadership of  one supplier that will imply a greater horizontal integration 
between suppliers in order to be able to design, manufacture, assemble and deliver the 
systems in the most efficient ways. 
There are several big European component groups that are moving in this direction such as: 
Mannesmann AG, who have recently integrated their automotive division Fichtel & Sachs; 
Boye AG; VDO Adolf Schindling AG; Mannesmann Kienzle; Rexroth; and Hartmann Braun, 
or like ITT, which is restructuring its European operations, merging Alfred Teves, SWF, De 
Konig, WIVO, and ITT Bergenstadt, in order to improve synergies and transfer of 
capabilities. 
4.2.4. Strategic alliances for purchasing: 
Another trend followed by vehicle manufacturers, that has an impact in the automotive 
components industry, is the establishment by OEMs of strategic alliances for purchasing. The 
rational of these strategic alliances is to reduce the cost of components by purchasing from 
common suppliers in larger quantities. It also reduces the size and costs of the purchasing 
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Peugeot in 1980, and the alliances between GM Europe and Saab in 1989, and Renault and 
Volvo in 1993. These two OEMs, for example, have plans to have at least 80% of their 
suppliers in common. 
These alliances may be the first step towards a deeper collaboration in the design of new cars, 
more common components, and increasing sourcing of  complete vehicles from other 
producers. These kind of cooperative agreements were rare in Japan until recently when a 
number of agreements have been announced: 
•  Honda-Isuzu: Isuzu withdrawing from passenger car production will source 
from Honda, and Honda will buy certain LCV  s from Isuzu; 
•  Nissan-Mazda: They will swap vans/LCV to cut development costs; 
•  Mazda-Isuzu: Agreement to share large components; 
•  Nissan-Toyota: Nissan will buy components from Aisan, an affiliated supplier 
partly owned by Toyota. The scope of the agreement involves even engine 
components like pumps. 
Examples of  recent agreements involving European OEMs are: 
•  VW-Renault-Opel: Agreement to buy gearboxes supplied by VW; 
•  Peugeot-Fiat:  Agreement to exchange engines; 
•  Renault-Peugeot-Volvo: Joint production of engines; 
•  Ford-Volkswagen: Agreement to manufacture a monospace vehicle in 
Portugal; 
•  Seat  -Suzuki: Agreement to design a small car in Spain. 
The impact of these agreements on the automotive components industry will be to increase the 
pressures for concentration. 
4.3.  Impact  on  the  components  suppliers  industry 
All these changes in the OEMs industry are driving a resuucturing of the supplier base in 
Europe. This is leading towards a reduction both in the number of direct suppliers to the 
automotive industry and in the total number of suppliers. 
4.3.1. Subsector concentration 
The 1991 study showed that the European component industry was relatively fragmented and 
composed mainly by medium and small companies: only 150 companies out of around 
3,200, had more than 1,000 employees, and 55% of the turnover was accounted for by 25 
groups. 
The number of  component companies operating in the different subsectors is decreasing as 
the concentration process continues. This process is a result of three simultaneous forces that 
are facilitating the attainment of the necessary critical mass of component supplier size: 
•  The acquisition of medium size companies, normally country leaders, by big 
European or US based multinationals or Japanese transplants; 
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companies operating normally in the same country; 
•  The exit from the sector of low performing companies with no survival 
prospects, and of companies with low percentages of their sales in the 
automotive sector. 
During the 1987-92 period around 350 mergers and acquisitions have taken place in the 
automotive components industry in Europe reinforcing the weight of the major groups. 
Around 70% of these have taken place between companies in different countries, thus 
reflecting the europeanisation of the industry as will be discussed later. Around 35 of these 
acquisitions in Europe have been made by Japanese manufacturers. The countries where the 
Japanese have been more active are the UK and Spain, countries where the Japanese OEMs 
are located. 
In some subsectors the concentration is leading to a very reduced number of main players: 2 
in carburettors (Weber-Solex and Pierburg), 2 in dashboards (Magneti-Marelli and VDO-
Mannesmann), 2 in sun roofs (Rockwell and Webasto), 3 in rear mirrors (Hohe, Britax-
Geco, and Gilardini), 3 in brakes (Bendix, Teves, Lucas-Girling), 3 in injection systems 
(Bosch, Marelli, GM), 3 in seats (Epeda-Bertrand Faure, Johnson Controls, 
Kaiper/Recarro), 4 in clutches (Look, Valeo, Fichtel und Sachs, and Automotive Products), 
4 in glasses (St. Gobain, Pilkington, SIV and ASAMI), 5 in pistons (KS, Mahle, T&N, 
Nural, and Tarabusi)  ... 
Even in subsectors such as the production of electrical wiring, where 11 manufacturers 
coexist, the financial difficulties (9 are losing money) of most of  them will lead to increased 
concentration (7 are reportedly for sale).  Another example of  recent subsector concentration 
is in engine management systems.  In 1989 there were 9 suppliers of which 3 were affiliated 
with major OEMs.  Four years later there are only 4 suppliers - the rest have either abandoned 
the sector or have sold out to other companies, for example the V  aleo operations who have 
been bought by SAGEM. 
The limit to this concentration process will be set by OEMs which are not interested in a 
higher concentration of components suppliers as this will shift the negotiating power within 
the value chain. An example of this was the opposition of OEMs to the Epeda-Bertrand Faure 
acquisition offer by Valeo in 1988. 
4.3 .2. Tiering of the industry 
The change from components to systems purchasing and the increased level of outsourcing 
are now forcing the tiering of the European automotive components industry. This tiering 
process is still in its early phase in Europe, but we believe that the process will continue and 
as a result the European industry will look more like the Japanese model by the end of the 
decade.  In the figure below we show the supplier base for a typical Japanese OEM.  The 
number of  suppliers in each tier is very similar to what European vehicle manufacturers think 
will be the final outcome.  For every first tier supplier there will be approximately 10 second 
tier suppliers and for every second tier supplier there will be another roughly 10 third tier 
suppliers. 
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Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 
Two different models for managing the chain are coexisting in Europe: 
•  OEM managed system; 
•  Supplier managed system. 
The OEM mana~ed  system normally represents the first phase in the tiering process. Under 
this model the OEM purchases the different components that constitute the system from 
different suppliers, but asks one of them to assemble the different parts and deliver the 
system to the OEM. This is a simple way to purchase systems and it is normally applied 
where there is not joint development. The assembly of the system is made by the supplier 
more conveniently located, who has the appropriate technology or the lowest costs. An 
example of this model is the tyre and wheel system that is normally purchased this way. 
The supplier mana~ed  system constitutes one step beyond in the tiering process. Under this 
model the OEM contracts the whole system or subsystem with one supplier (first tier) who in 
tum contracts with second tier suppliers the different parts of the system. This model is used 
mainly with systems that are jointly developed under a black-box design by the OEM and the 
first tier supplier. The first tier supplier is normally the one that needs to be more closely 
involved in the design phase, who has more importance in the cost structure or has higher 
quality requirements. An example of a system normally purchased under this model is seats. 
Tyre 
supplier 
OEM 
Component  Wheel 
1-------1~ supplier 
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-Physical 
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31 Some OEMs are adopting this approach using a two-step model.  They manage the process 
directly in the first phase and then transfer gradually the full responsibility to the first -tier 
supplier. 
4.3.3. Changes in the value chain activities performed 
The same trends and changes introduced by OEMs in relation with their first tier suppliers are 
being implemented by these in relation to the rest of the value chain. More specifically first 
tier suppliers are in general terms: 
•  Outsourcing the less critical activities; 
•  Reducing the number of suppliers; 
•  Increasing the europeanisation of  their purchasing activities. 
From the interviews, these trends are more apparent in the case of the biggest first tier 
component suppliers whereas smaller firms are less inclined to implement them. Their smaller 
size and the current recession create a strong pressure against  higher levels of outsourcing at 
present. 
Several first tier system suppliers interviewed claim to have reduced the number of direct 
suppliers by around 30% and have plans to reduce by another 30% over the next three years. 
In some specific cases suppliers have been reduced by two-thirds for some product groups. 
At the same time first  -tier suppliers have increased their level of outsourcing on average by 
50%. Some of them have reached outsourcing levels very close to the ones in the OEM 
industry: around 55%.  As one component supplier put it: "in order to improve our 
competitiveness we need to apply to our suppliers the same principles OEMs are applying to 
us". 
As shown in the figure below the tiering of the industry is creating several layers of 
companies with very different structural and capabilities characteristics. 
SYSTEM SUPPLIERS WILL BE CRITICAL IN THE TIERING PROCESS 
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Global/regional 
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High The figure on the next page describes more specifically in the case of automotive seats 
systems, the changes that are taking place in the distribution of  competences between the 
different players in the industry: 
4.4.  Direct  suppliers  reduction: 
As a result of  the above described trends in the OEMs and the consequent impact on the 
component suppliers industry, there has been an important decrease in the number of direct 
suppliers to OEMs. 
In the 1991 study it was highlighted that the Japanese assemblers had a much smaller number 
of direct suppliers: between 160 and 300 suppliers vs. 800-2000 for European OEMs. The 
advantage of a lower number of direct suppliers is in the simplification of management and 
coordination, the costs benefits derived from larger scale, the participation of the supplier in 
design and the possibility of a deeper relationship with the remaining ones. 
Since 1990, nearly all European vehicle manufacturers have reduced the number of direct 
suppliers, between 40 and 80% in the case of OEMs that have centralised their purchases, 
and all of them claim to have set more ambitious goals over the next several years. According 
to the interviews the objective will be to have around 150-300 direct suppliers by model by 
around 1997, which will be in line with Japanese practice.  The total number of suppliers by 
OEM will be higher as there will be some holdovers for old models. 
This reduction in the number of  direct suppliers has been greater than that which OEMs were 
considering when interviewed during the 1991 study, showing a clear change in the beliefs of 
the industry and a willingness to adopt a system much closer to the Japanese one. 
In some very specific cases there has been an increase in the total numbers of suppliers 
during this period due to a change in the mix of  models manufactured that has caused a 
temporary coexistence of the suppliers of the old and new models. 
In all the cases the new models recently developed are designed to require less suppliers. 
According to the figures of one OEM, the number of suppliers per model used to be around 
600-800 and has decreased to around 170-140 in the 1993-1994 models. Another OEM 
mentioned a 35% reduction of the number of suppliers going directly to the assembly line 
between  the last two models they have launched. 
33 The historic and planned reduction of direct suppliers to the OEMs, compared to the 
Japanese, is shown below: 
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US auto companies' number of suppliers has also been steadily decreasing.  Ford, for 
example, has reduced its worldwide supplier base by more than half since 1980 and has plans 
to pare 1992 supplier level by one third by 1995. Chrysler, who had around 2,500 suppliers 
in 1992 expects to use less than 1,000 suppliers by 1995 and around 750 by the end of the 
1990s. Nevertheless, this number of suppliers is still high compared with Japanese levels. 
The greater level of concentration of  component suppliers with direct contacts with the vehicle 
manufacturers does not necessarily imply a radical reduction in the number of independent 
component producers. Many are surviving as second or third tier suppliers to the component 
companies producing complete systems or subsystems. 
Estimates from OEM purchasing managers indicate that 60-70% of the suppliers that are no 
longer direct suppliers have become second-tier, and the rest have gone out of business or are 
no longer supplying to the automotive sector. The same process has happened in the US, 
where the industry associations expect the number of first-tier suppliers to fall 20% from 
1991 to 1996, and an even higher percentage in the case of second and third-tier suppliers. 
We expect this process to continue in the future, probably at a faster pace.  On the one hand, 
OEMs are continuing to reduce drastically their number of direct suppliers, and on the other 
hand, the precarious financial situation of the smaller and less efficient suppliers will force 
many of them to abandon the sector altogether. 
5.  THE EUROPEANISATION OF THE INDUSTRY 
Another structural change that vehicle manufacturers are forcing directly is the 
europeanisation of the components suppliers. This process has three main drivers: 
•  Increasing centralisation of vehicle design in one location at European level; 
•  Increasing trend towards more centralisation at European level of the 
purchasing decision making; 
•  The outsourcing of the final assembly of systems. 
34 As a result, component suppliers are more and more forced to adopt a European strategy in 
terms of  design, logistics, commercial activities, and manufacturing and assembling. 
Therefore Europe becomes the relevant market, instead of the different countries where the 
OEM and component suppliers are located. 
5.1.  Design  europeanisation 
OEMs have been rationalising their design facilities and capabilities by concentrating at 
European level their design centres in one specific country. Apart from Ford Europe who still 
has its design centres in two countries: the UK and Germany, the rest of the OEM design 
centres are centralised in one country and in many cases in just one location. The rationale 
behind this is the need to be more efficient in vehicle design. The co-location of all the 
functions involved in the design of the car in one single facility is a key factor for reducing 
the new product development (NPD) cycle time. 
OEMs VEHICLE DESIGN IS  CENTRALIZED 
Peugeot  France  F, E, UK 
Renault  France  F,E,P,8 
Citroen  France  F,E,P 
Ford  Germany, UK  0, E, P, 8, UK 
GM  Germany  0, E, 8, UK 
VW-Audi  Germany  O,E,P,8 
BMW  Germany  0 
Mercedes  Germany  O,E 
Fiat  Italy 
Consequently components suppliers are moving towards the "co-location", in a broad sense, 
of their R&D and design next to the OEMs design centers. The tendency towards black  -box 
design and simultaneous engineering reinforces the need for "co-location". 
From this point of  view, all major European and US OEMs are trying to reduce their NPD 
cycle times significantly. The new Opel Corsa has been developed in 36 months, containing 
30% fewer parts than its predecessor. The Chrysler Neon has been developed in 42 months, 
thanks to a partnership agreement with 25 main suppliers, with a 70% level of outsourcing. 
Renault has designed and launched its Twinge model in 33 months. Rover expects a new 
product development time of 24 months for its new model to be launched by 1995 compared 
to 27 months for its Rover 600.  This fast development time has been possible in part due to 
the maximum use of standard components besides adapting their NPD to Honda techniques. 
This can take different forms, from simply a deeper relationship in the design of new vehicles 
and their components, to the physical co-location of their design facilities in the client's 
premises. These can be summarised in: 
•  Technical collaboration; 
•  Exchange of engineers for special projects; 
•  "Liaison", "guest"  or "resident" engineers; 
35 •  Joint teams for R&D; 
•  R&D facilities near OEM design center or in logistically convenient places; 
•  R&D center within design OEM premises. 
These forms are used in different ways by the different component manufacturers, depending 
on the kind of supplier they are and the design phase of the new product. Normally the 
simpler collaboration mechanisms are used by part manufacturers, whereas the more complex 
are used by system suppliers where the need for joint R&D is vital for the efficiency of the 
design. 
When first tier component suppliers have various clients as is usually the case, they tend to 
have centralised R&D centres but they co-locate development teams nearby or within their 
different OEM customers for prototype development. 
5.2.  Purchasing  europeanisation 
As in design, purchasing decisions will be taken increasingly at the European level, even in 
cases where the OEM has assembly locations in different countries. In a way this is a 
consequence of  both the centralisation of  design and the increasing adoption of "black  -box" 
design procedures. Purchasing really starts when the vehicle is being designed and is no 
longer an independent process. 
Another reason for centralisation of  purchasing is the need to become more efficient in the 
major part of the vehicle cost structure, that of purchased components and materials. The 
centralisation allows a better control of suppliers, a reduction in their numbers, greater 
volumes per supplier and thus more leverage over prices, and the possibility of buying from 
the least cost suppliers regardless of country. 
Even though the europeanisation trend is clear, four different models coexist: 
•  Decentralisation; 
•  Coordinated decentralisation; 
•  Centralised decision-making; 
•  Central purchasing. 
The decentralised model that was widely used in the 1980s is based on the total autonomy of 
each country subsidiary or plant to purchase the required components if they meet the product 
specifications defined by the engineering department.  Some OEMs even had several design 
centres in different countries, which developed different versions of the same model, each of 
them with different components required, which then had to be bought locally. As a 
consequence, each subsidiary had its own purchasing organization. There was limited 
information sharing between the different purchasing organisations in order to optimise their 
procurement decisions. 
The coordinated decentralisation model is  a response to the need to coordinate the purchase 
of components from the same supplier by different country organisations. The model is based 
on major autonomy of the country subsidiaries under general guidelines or procedures issued 
at European corporate level. The different country purchasing organisations coexist under this 
model. 
In many cases the model implies the nomination of "lead buyers" at European level for 
selected components. Normally these are the components bought from the same legal entity 
or the same company but with different legal entities (this is normal in the case of  big 
36 conglomerates or component manufacturers with subsidiaries in different countries). In other 
cases lead buyers are implemented for critical components (e.g. safety related or high cost) 
where there is a need for centralised buying. Examples of OEMs that have implemented this 
approach are Seat  and Nissan. 
The centralised decision-making model is an evolution of  the previous one whose main 
characteristic is that the decisions are taken at European level either by a committee where the 
different purchasing organisations are represented or by a central staff. Despite the 
centralisation of the decision-making there is an operative decentralisation at country level for 
supplier screening and evaluation, and day-to-day contacts with suppliers.  Examples of 
OEMs that have implemented this model are OM and the PSA Group through Sogedac. 
Finally there is the central purchasing model in which the purchasing organisations are 
basically centralised at both decision-making and operations levels. Examples of  this model 
are Ford and Renault. 
DIFFERENT  MODELS  OF  PURCHASING  ORGANISATIONS 
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The final outcome of  the evolution probably will be a mixture of the last two models. The 
advantage of  the centralised decision making model for the component suppliers is that it 
allows a higher geographical dispersion of  the component suppliers as the operative 
decentralisation facilitates a better know  ledge and continuous screening of suppliers not 
located in the country where the purchasing decisions are taken. 
In response to the previous OEM trend, component suppliers are setting up commercial 
organisations that match the OEMs purchasing organisations in order to establish a closer 
relationship. In the case of component suppliers based in only one country, the normal 
outcome is to create a European wide commercial organisation that covers the countries where 
OEM decision making is based. In the case of multinational component suppliers, that is with 
different companies or plants across Europe, this is more complicated. 
Japanese component manufacturer transplants tend to use a common model. They set up a 
commercial organisation independent of  their manufacturing structure that manages the 
relationship with OEM and provides the products from the most appropriate plant. This 
commercial organisation can be unique for all Europe like in the case of  Nippondenso, or can 
be composed of several legal entities. For example, the Japanese transplant NSK has two 
commercial companies: one in Spain and another one in the UK. NSK UK centralises and 
coordinates all the relationship with Nissan UK even though the products may come from the 
Spanish plant.  Another characteristic of the Japanese is the "window man" figure. This is a 
client  account manager, that coordinates all contacts with the OEM. 
The situation of European component manufacturers is much less clear and in many cases 
inefficient. The vast majority of them still have independent commercial organisations by 
country, but are moving towards a European commercial network that matches the OEMs 
organisation. In order to speed up the europeanisation process some OEMs are forcing their 
suppliers to conduct their commercial relationship from the company located in the same 
country where the OEM is, even if the product is manufactured and sold from a different 
subsidiary. 
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Europeanisation of  manufacturing is taking place through two opposite but complementary 
trends: 
• 
• 
Location of component systems final assembly plants near those of OEMs'; 
Concentration of basic component production in single plants at European 
level. 
The first is a consequence of  the increasing outsourcing of sub-assemblies. During the early 
1980s OEMs outsourced the production of  individual components.  During the late 1980s 
they started to outsource the assembly of systems with a variable degree of implementation, 
and now in the 1990s they are starting to outsource more complex systems - and even, as 
announced by various OEMs, the assembly of  components in the vehicle assembly line itself. 
These trends are creating an imperative to be European and to have facilities co-located next to 
the OEM assembly plants. This has already happened in the case of seat systems and interior 
trim suppliers which have final assembly plants next to OEMs plants. This allows more 
efficient logistics and the true implementation of  JIT manufacturing as opposed to a JIT 
delivery that in many cases is based on intermediate stocks held by the component 
manufacturer. 
The second reason for europeanisation is for cost efficiency: there is a need to centralise at 
European level the production of basic components in plants specialised by product line. The 
objective will be to take advantage of  the economies of  scale at European levels in volume 
products like pistons, brakes or carburettors. 
A recent trend that is affecting the europeanisation of manufacturing is the delocalisation of 
production to Eastern Europe.  Although the moves have been limited there are various 
examples like: Pilkington setting up a plant in the former East Germany and a joint venture in 
Poland, Teves' new plants in Hungary, Rella plant in Mohalnice (CS) to supply Skoda, 
Lucas shifting capacity from Germany to the Czech Republic, Magnetti-Marelli investing in 
Poland to support the Fiat acquisition of  FMS, T &N acquiring several companies in Eastern 
Europe, ... 
Some other component manufacturers mentioned having plans to set up joint-ventures in 
Eastern Europe to supply OEMs based there.  In many cases the plants in Eastern Europe 
represent new capacity added to the European suppliers but in some cases, this represents a 
shift of capacity from Western Europe to Eastern Europe.  Finally, Eastern Europe 
component manufacturers are starting to be used as second or third-tier suppliers to European 
component companies. 
5.4.  Japanese  presence  in  Europe 
Japanese component manufacturers' presence in Europe is still very limited. The vast 
majority of the Japanese component transplants in Europe have been a consequence of  the 
presence of Japanese OEMs in Europe. Nissan has brought with them some of its key 
suppliers: Ikeda for seats, Kasai for interior trim, Yamato Kogyo for stamping; and Honda: 
Y  achiyo Kogyo for fuel tanks and Y otaka Giken for catalytic converters. 
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Nearly half of these initiatives have been joint ventures with European or European bases of 
US multinationals. Some examples are the joint-ventures between Ikeda and Johnson 
Controls, between Yachiyo Kogyo and Unipart, between NOK and Freudenberg, between 
Kasay Kogyo and Reydel, between Sumitomo Electric and Lucas, and between Bosch and 
Nippon ABS and Atsugi Unisia. 
More recently some Japanese component suppliers have entered Europe to supply directly 
European OEMs. Examples of these introductions are Yazaki (wirings), Nippondenso 
(radiators and coils), Inoue (control instruments), Tokei (dash panel clocks), Ryobi (casting 
parts for clutches), and Nippon Seiko (bearings). 
Nevertheless the presence of Japanese component suppliers is very low compared to the US. 
This is due to the still low production volumes of Japanese OEMs in Europe and the relatively 
higher competitiveness of  European suppliers today compared with the US ones when the 
Japanese set up their transplants in the US.  It also reflects the weaker financial situation of 
many Japanese producers today. 
Given the fact that the new Japanese transplants (Nissan, Toyota, Honda) have already 
selected their primary partnership relationships with mainly European producers, further 
penetration of  Japanese component makers will be only gradual, with alliances/joint ventures 
with European producers the primary mechanism.  For example, only 12 of the Nissan UK 
suppliers are Japanese transplants or Japanese joint-ventures.  Therefore, we do not foresee 
major new greenfield plants will be set up by Japanese component manufacturers in Europe. 
It  is worth pointing out that there are several examples of  joint ventures between Japanese and 
European component manufacturers entering the US market such as Japan Brake and T&N 
(brake components), Nippondenso and Bosch (fuel pumps), Yazaki and VDO (meters), 
Sumitomo Electric and Lucas (disc brakes). 
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6.  SUPPLY  CHAIN  MANAGEMENT  CHANGES 
6.1.  An  emerging paradign 
A new paradign is emerging in the OEM/  component relationship.  This new paradigm not 
only affects the way in which the value added activities are shared between OEMs and 
component suppliers but also has implications for the kind of relationship established within 
the industry. 
This new paradigm has important implications for the components industry both in terms of 
its structure and of the capabilities required by component manufacturers. The result will be 
an industry composed of: 
•  Fewer but larger suppliers; 
•  With a European presence; 
•  Assembling systems near OEMs; 
•  Manufacturing in scale efficient locations; 
•  Subcontracting non core production. 
And basing their competitiveness on: 
•  Continuously improving operational effectiveness (productivity, speed and 
quality); 
•  Creating superior new product/prototype development capabilities; 
•  Optimising the management of logistics; 
•  Developing a powerful MIS and human resources platform. 
From a structure based on confrontation, the industry is moving towards one based on 
partnership where profit is shared amongst the different players in the value chain. OEMs will 
focus their activities on the design of the car, the manufacturing of very few key components 
based on core competences (  eg engines, gear boxes, bodywork and painting) and the 
assembly of systems supplied by a reduced number of better qualified suppliers that 
participate actively in the vehicle design. 
i.::.:;.;~t~H~t11;~i~,g~!:!}~i~~:~~t~ 
Design:  •  All developed by OEM 
•  High integration 
Manufacturing:  •  Volume In cars 
Assembly: 
Value chain 
management: 
•  Marginal focus 
•  Confrontation with 
suppliers and dealers 
•  OEM profit focus 
•  Many suppliers of 
fragmented parts 
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Vs. 
•  Joint development with 
component manufacturers 
•  High outsourcing 
•  Volume in engines 
•  Main focus 
•  Deep relationship with 
suppliers and dealers 
•  Chain profit focus 
•  Few suppliers of systems Besides the different sharing of  the value added activities within the supply chain, the 
capabilities of the different players of the industry should be adapted to the maximisation of 
the chain's value. 
The dimensions along which a new relationship can be established are: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Contractual relationship; 
New product development; 
Physical flows; 
Electronic Data Interchange (ED  I); 
General support  . 
These mechanisms and the capabilities required will be very different for first  -tier systems 
suppliers and the rest of the suppliers in the chain. Nevertheless many of the mechanisms that 
are being established between OEMs and first  -tier suppliers will be also 
set up between the first  -tier and second-tier suppliers. This will reflect the adoption by first-
tier suppliers of many of the changes that OEMs are implementing: greater outsourcing, JIT 
logistics, suppliers reduction,  ...  There will also be commodity suppliers with direct access to 
OEMs, but with a type of relationship different from that of  first tier suppliers. 
6.2.  First tier  systems  suppliers 
As a result of the structural changes underway, a new kind of relationship is being 
implemented in the industry. Each OEM is likely to have a set of major "lead" suppliers per 
vehicle model where: 
•  Contracts will be model-life long; 
•  R&D efforts will be shared; 
•  Costs will be optimised for the whole chain and prices driven off costs; 
•  Suppliers will be continually evaluated; 
•  Production processes will be improved by common teams. 
6.2.1. Contractual relationship 
Whereas in the 1980s procurement contracts were mainly short-term (1-2 years duration), the 
situation is changing and the contract lengths tend to be longer. Legally there are few long-
term contracts between OEMs and suppliers, but in practice most already are. The majority of 
OEMs are adopting the policy of having long-term relationship for complex systems. These 
in many cases are "model life contracts". Nevertheless, even though the trend is clear there 
are still some OEMs that have the majority of the components they purchase under one year 
contracts, like the PSA Group, Mercedes-Benz and Seat. 
Another important change is that sourcing decisions are made earlier by European vehicle 
manufacturers, following the Japanese practice of early supplier involvement in design and 
product development, therefore moving from contracts for "parts" to contracts for 
"comakership". 
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As a result of the new contractual relationship, prices are also starting to be set in a different 
way.  During the 1980s prices were typically negotiated every year by the OEMs.  This is still 
valid for commodity components but for systems and complex components there is a trend 
towards an approach similar to that of the Japanese. 
"Target pricing" consists of analysing what the customer is willing to pay compared to 
competitors, and then working backwards together with key systems suppliers, to cost every 
component in order to bring in the vehicle at the target price.  Once the price is defined for 
each component, the OEM and the supplier agree on a cost improvement programme for the 
expected life of the component whose benefits will be shared.  Mercedes has recently 
announced its move towards this system of target pricing. 
Nevertheless, European OEMs have not fully implemented this approach yet.  The need to 
reduce the competitiveness gap of  European component manufacturers, the drop in demand 
and the urgent need to reduce costs has led OEMs to mandate yearly price reductions across 
the board. 
6.2.2. New product development 
As mentioned before, first tier system suppliers are starting to play a key role in the 
development of new products: 
•  OEMs are concentrating their efforts on their core competences: basic design 
specifications of  new models, design and assembly of engines, styling, etc; 
•  New product development times are being shortened drastically, reaching 
Japanese standards; 
•  Black-box design is growing in importance. 
As a result first tier suppliers are enhancing their design capabilities, creating joint 
development centers with OEMs, co-locating them or providing "guest" engineers,  investing 
more in R&D, and integrating CAD-CAM design processes with OEMs. Nevertheless it 
seems from the interviews with components suppliers that there is still reluctance by some 
OEMs to delegate design responsibilities to suppliers.  As a result instead of pure "black-box" 
systems, many European OEMs are moving increasingly to "grey-box" design where 
specifications are jointly developed, the supplier takes on design responsibility and interfaces 
are developed jointly through a design-in process. 
R&D investments of the major system suppliers have been increasing and range currently 
from 3% to 12% of sales, the European average being 6%.  Component suppliers 
interviewed do not think R&D investments will increase in the future as a percentage of sales. 
On the one hand current investment is considered, in many cases to be adequate, and on the 
other the cash-flow generation of the industry does not allow higher investments.  The 
average increase of R&D expenditure of  major suppliers has been 6% to the 1988-93 period. 
The interviews also show that smaller competitors even though they have lower R&D 
expenditures (around 1-2%  ), have made an important effort to improve their capabilities with 
increases of around 45% in that period.  Nevertheless, they are facing problems in continuing 
to invest at the same pace. 
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R&D investments will also be a consequence of the need for enhancing systems in order to 
improve competitiveness by offering more sophisticated solutions. The main technological 
trends and requirements in the next ten years for chassis system cited in interviews, for 
example, are the following: 
•  Brakes: ABS for small cars, increased use of disk brakes, electronic slip or 
traction control; 
•  Axles: Newly designed axles and suspensions; 
•  Springs/shock absorption: Adaptative springs and shock absorbers, semi-
active and active systems; 
•  Steering: Increased use of power steering, four wheel steering eventually; 
•  Drive: Intelligent automatic transmissions, slip control, low-cost solution for 
automatic transmissions in the mass market; 
•  Wheels and tyres: Light metal rims, tyre-rim concept; 
•  Overall electronics: Engine electronics, electronic fuel systems, chassis 
electronics, driver information systems, passive systems, valve timing 
systems. 
Apart from these technology driven developments there will be others related to 
environmental and safety issues, thus increasing the investments needed in R&D. 
In the medium-term the above described changes in the design process will be leading 
towards greater industry wide cooperation. OEMs will start developing certain new models 
together, will favour technical standards harmonisation and complete systems in some cases 
may be designed by alliances of component manufacturers. 
6.2.3. Physical flows 
This is an area where the relationships between first tier suppliers and OEMs are changing at 
a fast pace. The objective is to optimise the operations of  both players and reduce the costs 
and complexities of logistics, 
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•  Consolidation centre  D  Warehouse  ~  Supplier plant  E!J  OEM Assembly line 
In the 1980s the model most widely used was consolidation centres that were based on the 
existence of warehouses managed by the OEMs where they consolidated the components sent 
by their suppliers before sending them to the assembly plant. The objective was to reduce 
costs through shared transport. The major drawback is the existence of safety stocks in both 
the OEMs and the supplier's plants. This model is still partially used by several OEMs 
In the early 1990s OEMs are starting to use control warehouses with the objective of fully 
implementing JIT delivery. The concept is to have next to the OEM assembly plants a series 
of warehouses managed by the component suppliers or by independent companies where the 
suppliers deliver their products until they are sent JIT to the assembly line. In many cases 
OEMs require systems or components to be delivered directly to the assembly line by 
personnel contracted by the suppliers. This model has the drawback of creating buffer 
inventories at these warehouses, and in fact  transfers the costs from the OEM to the supplier. 
This model is mainly used by Japanese transplants in Europe and other OEMs like Seat. 
The last step is the final assembly co-location. This model is starting to be used  for 
component systems like seats, and different OEMs are announcing their move towards it. The 
idea is to fully synchronise OEM-first tier supplier assembly lines, setting up true JIT 
synchronous manufacturing and assembly as opposed to a simpler and less efficient JIT 
delivery. The major drawback is the big investments required to co-locate physically both 
assembly plants. Ford and VW are moving towards a wider implementation of this concept. 
All these logistics improvements are supported by the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
systems that are being increasingly used by OEMs and suppliers.  Purchasing programmes, 
delivery communication and labelling are used by all of  them but some other applications like 
electronic invoicing, payment, and packaging standards, are still in early phases of 
implementation. 
An area of future development will be the use of EDI systems for design (CAD-CAM). The 
majority of OEMs mentioned in interviews that they had plans to invest further in this area. 
Currently some OEMs, such as Volvo, are testing the transfer of drawings using the 
ODETTE system. 
6.2.4. General support 
With the aim of  improving the competitiveness and efficiency of first tier component 
suppliers, OEMs are establishing ambitious programmes to assist them. Japanese OEMs have 
a long tradition of  programmes where engineers from the OEM visit the supplier premises to 
analyse the main processes and define the areas where manufacturing process effectiveness 
can be improved. These programmes range from the "two days quick hits" to one month 
improvement programmes. 
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now implemented in different forms by almost all vehicle manufacturers. PSA has its "Global 
productivity programme", Ford its "Drive for leadership" with cost analysis teams based in 
the UK, Rover its "RG 2000" programme and so on.  It appears from the interviews that the 
European approach is based more on diagnosing and finding solutions for specific problems 
whereas the Japanese one is focused more on teaching and implementing methodology on 
how to improve processes on a continuous basis. 
Apart from these supplier development teams, there are other forms of collaboration that 
OEMs have put in place like blue collar workers exchange (Ford), personnel exchange with 
major suppliers (Mercedes Benz), training programmes (GM), seminar on human resource 
management techniques (Rover), .... 
All these efforts made by OEMs are complementing the internal training programmes 
undertaken by the component suppliers.  According to the interviews, training costs have 
increased substantially during the 1988-92 period.  In many cases they have doubled and 
even trebbled as a percentage of sales.  This is particularly true for the smaller component 
suppliers. 
The "kyoryokukai" or suppliers clubs is another form of establishing a channel for support 
and collaboration between the OEM and its suppliers. Although it is widely adopted in Japan, 
none of the OEMs based in Europe has established such a club. According to the interviews 
this is due to the fact that European component manufacturers tend to supply to a large 
number of OEMs. The majority of the European component suppliers have around 4-6 main 
clients.  Nevertheless, Japanese OEM transplants are starting to encourage the creation of 
such clubs (Nissan and Toyota are experimenting with the concept in the UK). 
Even though the supplier clubs do not formally exist, some OEMs are encouraging the 
transfer of expertise from one supplier to another and the sharing of "best practice" between 
all of them.  This is applied in some cases like Nissan, even to suppliers of the same type of 
components or of tooling and equipment. 
Another kind of support is the initiative set up by Rover to educate its first tier suppliers to 
work with the second tier and help them to develop the necessary skills. 
6.2.5. Supplier evaluation 
At the same time OEMs are periodically evaluating their suppliers through an structured 
process that allows them to benchmark the evolution of the supplier's competitiveness. The 
main changes from the situation in the 1980s are that the frequency of these evaluations has 
increased, and the measures have changed reflecting evolution in the competitiveness of 
European suppliers. 
As mentioned in the previous BCG study, the main criteria around which suppliers used to be 
evaluated reflected the type of relationship existing between OEMs and suppliers and the 
areas where suppliers were weaker: 
•  Cost; 
•  Quality; 
•  Delivery times; 
•  Financial soundness; 
•  Technological expertise. 
Nowadays according to the interviews carried out ,these criteria have evolved and tend to 
measure capabilities as well. At the same time the measures have become more sophisticated. 
The new criteria include: 
•  International presence; 
•  Operational effectiveness; 
•  Logistics efficiency; 
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•  System integration capabilities; 
•  Investment capacity. 
Instead of final cost alone, OEMs tend to measure now also operational effectiveness, that is, 
the efficiency of  all the activities and processes performed by the supplier and their impact on 
the cost structure. Delivery times are no longer the key criteria as most suppliers are now 
delivering components on time; therefore a new measure is the logistics effectiveness, that is, 
how the whole logistic function is performed by  the supplier. As design has increased in 
importance the appropriate measure is no longer technology  but the excellence of the design 
and system integration capabilities. Finally, financial soundness has been substituted by the 
supplier capacity to generate the required cash for the investments needed. 
Quality, traditionally very important, is a minimum requirement where first tier suppliers have 
reached adequate standards, although improvement is still needed.  If  we compare quality 
indicators of  1  apanese component manufacturers and European ones, as internal data from 
OEMs show, there is still room for improvement. 
6.3.  Other  suppliers 
The relationship between first tier suppliers and second tier suppliers is following some of the 
changes described above. Nevertheless, the implementation is much slower and will not fully 
occur until the changes in the relationship are rooted between first -tier suppliers and OEMs. 
According to the interviews with OEMs and to the analysis of financial indicators, the 
competitiveness gap of second tier suppliers is even higher.  Therefore urgent action is 
needed. 
The competitiveness dimensions of second tier suppliers are different to first tier ones as a 
result of the different role within the value chain.  Manufacturing process efficiency is critical 
as cost is the main selection criteria, whereas design is less important even though it will play 
a more active role as outsourcing from first tier suppliers begins to increase. 
The areas where progress has been higher are the ones related to logistics: EDI systems, JIT 
delivery, and physical flows optimisation.  In many cases second tier suppliers are also 
evaluated by OEMs, reflecting the tum to a whole value chain management perspectives. 
On the other hand the areas where the level of changes in the relationship has been lower are 
the contractual relationship and price setting. Contracts between first and second tier suppliers 
tend to be short-term, are awarded under competitive tender, and prices are renegotiated 
periodically. 
Addressing the competitiveness of subsequent tiers in the supply chain is a major area for 
improvement and action during the coming years.  First tier suppliers should force and 
support improvements in the competitiveness of  second and third-tier suppliers.  In some 
cases this can be done with the involvement of OEMs, but in the vast majority first tier 
suppliers should lead the process. 
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7.  IMPLICATIONS FOR EC POLICY 
The competitiveness gap of the European components industry relative to Japan remains 
alarmingly large.  Clearly the major efforts to improve their competitiveness must come from 
the individual companies themselves, and increasingly importantly by joint cooperative 
efforts among the different levels of the supply chain: 
•  OEMs working with first tier suppliers; and 
•  First tier producers working with their suppliers, either alone or together with 
their OEM partners. 
Nevertheless, the EC can play a useful supporting role in facilitating the necessary changes. 
The main policy areas include: 
•  Training and retraining, employment measures; 
•  Standards; 
•  R&D and technology; 
•  Competition policy. 
7  .1.  Training and Retraining 
Very large improvements of  productivity are required of the workforce over the next several 
years to close the competitive gap with Japan.  This requires the adoption of improved 
manufacturing and new product development processes and overall improvements in 
operational effectiveness.  The adoption of  leaner production processes will require increased 
teamworking and interpersonal skills, problem-solving abilities at all levels of the workforce, 
multifunctional skills, basic computer literacy, etc.  All of this will necessitate greatly 
increased levels of training to upgrade the skills of the workforce in the components industry. 
The introduction of new production methods like "lean production", and the focus on 
new parameters like Total Quality Management (TQM) or Time-Based Competition (TBC), 
require training and education programmes.  These should cover issues like the human 
resource and organisational changes needed to implement the new processes, as well as the 
techniques, software and methods to develop the activity in a more effective way, including 
problem solving techniques. 
Upgrading the design capabilities implies training on new product development 
processes both in terms of processes and design technologies like advanced CAD-CAM 
systems.  The increase in black-box design and in component systems development is forcing 
the component manufacturers to build a new set of capabilities internally or with the help of 
theOEMs. 
A third area of training needs is in logistics.  The europeanisation of the industry that is 
leading to an increase in cross-border shipments, the fact that OEMs are starting to outsource 
the logistics management to suppliers, the higher sophistication of  the transport and 
warehouse systems, and the increasing importance of JIT delivery and manufacturing 
stresses the importance of training in this area. 
Another area of basic training is computer systems.  The increasing use of EDI and other 
systems both in the production-logistic and administrative areas and, in the future in the 
design area, will require the workforce to be more systems literate. 
Training requirements may be higher in the case of medium and small companies that are 
second tier suppliers or trying to become first  -tier suppliers and therefore need to master the 
technologies of the other components that are part of the systems they develop or assemble. 
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discussion (such as expanded uses of  the Social Fund or Structural Fund).  Given the 
importance of the automotive industry in terms of size of employment, and perhaps more 
importantly, as a continued pioneer in defining leading edge manufacturing techniques for 
industry as a whole, the automotive components industry should play a key role in defining 
the specific content of the EC training policies. 
One specific sectoral policy of  limited cost, but potentially high impact in giving impetus to 
the restructuring process involved and motivating management and the workforce to commit 
to the prolonged training required is an EC sponsored education programme.  The UK and 
other EC countries have sponsored series of regional seminars to component companies to 
inform them of the nature of the competitive gap to be overcome, key trends in the 
competitive environment and structure of the industry, and specific steps companies can 
begin to take (together with their customers and suppliers) to improve their competitiveness. 
A similar type of programme on an EC-wide basis could be particularly helpful in "jump 
starting" the restructuring particularly among the smaller and medium-sized second tier 
companies, where the improvement in competitiveness is perhaps most critical and awareness 
of the challenges they face and directions of change least well advanced.  The programme 
could consist of a series of 1-2 day seminars/workshops in the key regions of all the main EC 
countries, with the support of CLEP  A and the national associations. 
European universities can probably play a role, especially with small and medium sized 
companies, setting up exchange programmes and helping them to evaluate means to improve 
their competitiveness. 
Apart from the specific training at the workplace (on the job training), the EC should, to the 
extent possible, foster an improvement of the general education programmes and an 
adaptation to the current reality. Language learning for example should be emphasized at 
school level, certain skills like moulding, drop forging, acoustics and automotive electronics 
should be trained at polytechnics and similar schools in order to reduce the shortage of 
qualified workers in specific areas. This is causing an inflation of  salaries in certain areas or 
in other cases a less efficient use of the technologies available. 
Numerous studies, like the ones carried out by the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research in the UK, indicate the need to emphasize high standards of basic education and 
vigorous programmes aimed at continuous employee development, as shown in the Japanese 
industry skills model. 
7  .2.  Employment  and  Labour  Policy  Measures 
The rationalisation of  the industry and the need to improve productivity, together with the fact 
that market growth will be lower than that required to match increases in productivity, are 
creating an excess of employment in the component manufacturing industry. Compensating 
factors such as the increase in outsourcing by OEMs and the higher sophistication and 
importance of  equipment and componentry in new models will not be enough to 
counterbalance it.  As mentioned earlier, around 400-500,000 jobs are expected to be 
eliminated in the next seven years.  The impact of this may be particularly severe in certain 
major car producing regions within the different countries. 
The EC, through the Social Fund and other regional assistance measures, can help cushion 
the social and economic impact of the unemployment caused by the inevitable radical 
restructuring required.  Measures for retraining and redeployment of affected employees will 
be required. 
The labour regulations in general in the EC and specifically in some countries are much more 
restrictive than in the US and Japan. The flexibility to adapt the labour force to short-term 
production requirements and long-term demand is very restrictive. Therefore any support 
from the EC to make the personnel redundancies and short-time working procedures simpler, 
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industry forums. 
The EC might assist in its overall labour market policies the industry's need to have higher 
workforce mobility and flexibility within the sector. In some countries labour regulations and 
unions make it extremely difficult for a company to move one employee among different 
areas of  even the same plant (e.g. from the maintenance group to the assembly line or from a 
specialised machining activity to another even after the required training). 
The EC Commission may be able to play a role by promoting and coaching a social dialogue 
as well as by setting the grounds for labour regulations more in line with the new production 
systems requirements (lean production, flexibility, geographical and functional mobility, 
etc.). 
7  .3.  Standards 
The EC should continue to support the harmonisation at a European level of the different 
standards, norms and regulations affecting the automotive industry. Technical harmonisation, 
as the Commission recognises it, is a prerequisite for the practical fulfillment of the internal 
market. 
In the first place, the EC should foster initiatives of OEMs and component suppliers to unify 
both technical and quality standards. The harmonisation of technical standards will allow 
component suppliers to reduce significantly the number of references they produce to supply 
the same product to different OEMs and thereby bring down costs. For example, a leading 
electrical wiring manufacturer claimed that they could reduce the number of items produced 
from 1  ,300 to 50 if OEMs harmonised their technical requirements. 
The lack of harmonisation of quality certification norms and procedures was a big 
complaint from the suppliers during the previous study, as it required excessive paperwork, 
cost and time to satisfy the differing quality certification procedures established by the various 
vehicle manufacturers.  The spread of the ISO 9000 standard across the industry has been a 
great improvement, buts its application still varies from country to country.  The adoption has 
been, for example, greater in the UK. 
Nevertheless, although some OEMs like GM or Ford are adopting ISO 9000 in substitution 
of their previous quality systems, there are still some OEMs that require suppliers to undergo 
their specific quality procedures even though  they may have been certified under the ISO 
9000.  This creates unnecessary costs to both OEMs and suppliers in terms of time involved, 
personnel requirements, and related expenses. 
Further efforts should be made to make use of the norm more widespread by: 
•  Having more OEMs adopt it not only for company quality certifications but also 
for products; 
•  Having more second tier suppliers certified under the ISO 9000; 
•  Pushing the rigour of the standards so that it meets more of the requirements 
fromOEMs. 
An industry group of OEM and component industry representatives should be set up in order 
to decide whether a next generation of stricter quality standards should be defined, and which 
are the parameters or criteria to be included so that it conforms to the widest set of different 
OEM requirements. 
In the previous BCG report it was pointed out that one obstacle to the implementation of  JIT 
logistics and manufacturing within the EC automotive industry was the low penetration of 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems.  This has changed and currently EDI 
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and third tier ones. 
Unfortunately two major systems coexist: Odette which has been adopted by the majority of 
OEMs, with its French variation GALlA and FORD  NET implemented by Ford.  This creates 
unnecessary extra costs in terms of  equipment and training needs for component producers 
according to the interviews. 
CLEPA and the EC should promote the further use ofEDI systems by the industry, pushing 
for the widening of the information exchanged.  Different OEMs and suppliers are 
experimenting with new kinds of data to be interchanged, like electronic invoicing, packaging 
standards and design drawings.· 
Monitoring by the EC and CLEP  A may help prevent the uncontrolled proliferation of other 
types of standards.  Improved Electronic Data Interchange will help cycle time reduction and 
improvement of the cost position of both OEMs and suppliers by reducing administrative 
overheads. 
The harmonisation of CAD-CAM systems among OEMs is also needed, but is very 
difficult to implement.  As the R&D director of a component manufacturer said "we have to 
deal with seventeen different CAD systems, which forces us to allocate time, software, 
equipment and people away from more efficient activities". 
This is the area where the diversity of systems is greatest in Europe, particularly when 
compared with Japan, where as a result of the existence of  close links between individual 
OEMs and their respective suppliers, each supplier only uses one CAD-CAM system. 
OEM  CAD/CAM  System 
Ford  PDGS/Computer Vision 
Mercedes  CATIA 
Renault  Euclide 
PSA  Computer Vision 
Nissan  Alpha Cad 
Seat-VW  ICBM (CAD), CATIA (CAM) 
Moreover, this complexity is increased by the fact that in many cases second tier suppliers or 
external designers use other systems. 
At the same time,  suppliers are forced by vehicle manufacturers to use different CAD-CAM 
stations for each system.  This is specially onerous in those countries where several OEMs 
are based. 
Although from the point of view of the suppliers there is a strong need for harmonisation, the 
issue is very controversial at OEM level due to: 
•  High current investments in CAD-CAM systems and the training of personnel in 
their use that represent a financial barrier to change; 
•  Risk of design leaks to other OEMs.  Design is an area where OEMs are 
increasingly basing their competitive advantage. 
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efforts are made by OEMs, suppliers and equipment manufacturers to analyse different 
possibilities to increase the harmonisation of  CAD-CAM systems like: 
• 
• 
Improving the interfaces between the current systems; 
Developing a new generation of CAD-CAM that can be adopted by the whole 
industry over the next several years. 
The EC should use its persuasion efforts in this area due to the high impact in the cost 
competitiveness of the industry not only directly: CAD-CAM investments and training 
requirements will be lower, but also indirectly: it will bring a greater commonality of 
component designs and will allow earlier strategic alliances for design and exchange of 
components. 
More generally, the EC should continue to push the harmonisation of regulations that affect 
the automotive industry, like environmental requirements (e.g. the use of asbestos in 
brakes is forbidden only in certain countries, use of nitrosamine and PVC, definition of 
common criteria on emissions control),  safety standards (e.g. certification processes for 
different components varies through the EC). It is specially important to set a clear definition 
of what are considered to be recyclable materials because current national regulations adopt 
different criteria. 
Another area where action from the EC may be helpful are the legislative and regulatory 
constraints affecting manufacturing sites both in relation to the external environment 
(environment protection, energy consumption, waste management, recycling, etc.) and to 
conditions inside the sites (safety, accidents, etc.). 
When harmonising or issuing directives in relation with such areas, it would be useful for the 
Commission to take into account the current situation in other countries like the US and 
Japan, in order to analyse the cost and competitive implications of the different requirements 
set by regulation. 
7  .4.  Research and Development  and Technology  Policy 
The overall level of spending on R&D in the European automotive industry, both at OEM and 
components levels, is comparable to that in Japan and the US.  Basic technology remains one 
of the strengths of the EC industry, and many of the most innovative component companies 
in the world are in Europe.  Continued investment in basic research and development will be 
necessary to maintain the EC industry's competitive position in this area, and to meet the new 
requirements imposed by environmental and safety concerns, traffic congestion, different 
forms/fuels for propulsion, use of new and recyclable materials, etc. 
Even though there are a variety of EC programmes to fund R&D, like BRITE-EURAM, both 
the industry associations and the companies claim that the access procedures are difficult, 
especially for small companies (the ones that need it more) and do not take into account 
product-process interaction.  The fact that the funding is "pre-competitive" also inhibits most 
small and medium-sized companies.  As a result, data from some member countries shows 
that the component industry has received proportionally less funds than other sectors in 
relation to its economic importance. 
Due to the increase in black  -box design, the EC should foster and encourage the development 
of partnerships between OEMs and component suppliers by supporting common R&D 
projects. Moreover, if  these projects involve more than one OEM, the objective of  greater 
commonality of parts will be attained, thus helping reduction in the cost of the parts. This is a 
typical pattern in Japan, where a greater proportion of R&D is carried out by groups of 
companies rather than by individual ones. In Europe the number of  joint development 
programmes is still small.  The Commission might assume a catalytic role here. 
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electronics, aluminum, specialty steel, ... This cooperation will make it possible to develop 
those aspects of generic technologies which are relevant to the automotive and components 
industry. 
Our previous analysis indicates the growing importance for first tier system suppliers, and 
other component makers with products requiring development efforts in close collaboration 
with the OEM, to col  ocate engineering/development support next to the OEMs main R&D 
centre, or at least provide "guest engineers" available to work in the OEMs premises. 
Increasingly, this will be a requirement to continue to sell to the OEM in a long-term 
partnership relationship. 
One possible initiative for the EC to consider promoting/assisting is for cross-border efforts, 
ie, where a component manufacturer in one EC member country locates a 
design/engineering/technical support team at the site of an OEM located in another EC 
country.  The EC might consider partial funding of the initial start  -up costs of component 
producers (especially medium-sized and small ones) for establishing such technical support 
operations. 
In general the EC should shift emphasis to the improvement of process technology as 
opposed to basic R&D. The major problem faced by European component suppliers in 
relation with their Japanese counterparts is the gap in process efficiency and productivity. 
The EC Commission should not limit the funding to "pre-competitive projects" as they tend to 
discriminate against small companies and also because the benefits of this R&D are long term 
whereas the need to increase competitiveness is urgent. There is a need to move faster from 
technological breakthroughs to the production of components and parts with higher 
performance and lower costs. 
7  .5.  Competition  Policy 
The components industry will undergo a fundamental restructuring over the next several 
years.  The concentration at a European level of the first tier suppliers in different component 
systems/subsystems is both an inevitable outcome of the reduction of the number of suppliers 
by the OEMs and a desirable outcome in terms of increasing the overall competitiveness of 
the European automotive industry.  By the end of the 1990s there should be a more equal 
balance of power between the remaining strong first tier suppliers and the vehicle 
manufacturers. 
As CLEP  A has pointed out, there is a need to clarify the concept of "relevant market" in EC 
competition rules to allow such necessary concentration to occur.  Competitive situations 
should be regarded more broadly in terms of: 
•  Product or subsector definition: systems purchasing is increasing in importance; 
and 
•  Geographical scope: country market bases are not as relevant in an European 
regional context and in the global market. 
Increased collaboration between OEMs and component makers, as discussed throughout this 
report, is a key to improving the competitiveness of the European industry.  The "open book" 
philosophy of access to costs and joint targets for price/cost reductions, sharing of best 
practices among the component suppliers of a given OEM, etc, should be encouraged. 
Competition policy should support these cooperative efforts as far as possible, rather than 
impose obstacles to their realisation. 
***** 
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Over the last few years there has been a fundamental change in attitudes in the European 
automotive industry at both the OEM and component level regarding the imperatives for 
change.  There is an emerging consensus regarding the needs to: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Radically reduce the number of direct suppliers and introduce a tiered supply 
chain structure; 
Outsource more to component suppliers; 
Involve first tier suppliers in design and shift to systems purchasing; 
Improve productivity and stock turns by adopting lean production processes  . 
Steps have been taken in all these directions but the real challenge lies ahead as 
implementation begins in earnest . 
The current downturn in consumer demand across Europe, the pressures on profitability in 
the OEMs and their demands for large price reductions from their suppliers, and the rapid 
build-up of  Japanese transplant production will accelerate the process of restructuring.  A 
radical change in structure of the industry is likely.  The most important changes are outlined 
below: 
•  Likely concentration at the OEM level, in terms of demands for components, 
through mergers and/or shared component production; 
•  Radical reduction in number of direct suppliers to OEMs to around 500 principal 
first tier suppliers; 
•  Reduction in the number of remaining supplier companies by up to one-third; 
•  Reduction in total employment in the independent components sector from just 
below 1 million to around 500,000 by 1999, as productivity increases required 
outstrip growth caused by further outsourcing by OEMs. 
For first tier suppliers competitiveness will be a function of both their structural positions 
and capabilities: 
Positional advantages will be important for the competitiveness of first tier suppliers. 
The scale advantages in research and development and manufacturing on a regional 
(European) and global basis are likely to lead to increased concentration to say 3-5 European 
first tier companies in any given component system or type.  Most of these producers will 
also need to form global alliances or investments in the US and Japan to maintain their 
technology lead in an increasingly global business. 
At the same time that scale advantages argue for centralisation of their R&D and critical 
manufacturing steps, it will be important for successful first tier suppliers to establish local 
presence next to key OEMs in the different EC countries, often by establishing a final 
assembly step for a system next to the OEMs plant and by establishing design/engineering 
support near the R&D centre of  the vehicle manufacturer.  Like OEMs, first tier suppliers will 
seek to improve their competitiveness by concentrating only on core activities, outsourcing a 
greater proportion of their value-added to competitive second tier suppliers. 
53 •  Relative scale in system 
- manufacturing 
•  R&D 
•  Global reach/alliances 
•  Local presence next to key OEMs 
p  final assembly 
- design/ engineering support 
•  High level of outsourcing 
•  Technology platform 
•  Speed of new product/prototype 
development 
•  Effective manufacturing and 
logistics processes 
•  Management of own supply chain 
Capabilities will also be key to the competitiveness of first tier suppliers.  Their technology 
"platform" or set of  core technologies that are applied in satisfying the product development 
requirements of  their key OEM customers will need to be continually improved.  Their 
effectiveness at the process of  applying their technologies in rapid new product/prototype 
development in line with the OEMs requirements will be critical.  An effective "lean" 
manufacturing process is also crucial. 
A key capability for the future will be their own supply chain management.  They will need to 
select their own strategic suppliers, outsource more to them, manage the logistics process, 
and very importantly, work with these second tier suppliers to improve their competitiveness. 
Their effectiveness at this largely new role of  supply chain management will be critical for the 
overall competitiveness of  the European automotive industry.  The second tier suppliers are 
arguably the part of the overall chain where the greatest challenge to improve productivity 
exists and where awareness of the challenge and means to improve competitiveness is least 
advanced. 
For second tier suppliers the key challenge will be operational effectiveness: 
•  High productivity; 
•  Lean manufacturing process; 
•  High quality; 
•  Logistics capability; 
•  Good interface with their customers and closer relationship. 
For many product areas their R&D and product development capabilities will also be 
important. 
EC support in training, employment measures, harmonisation of standards (for quality 
certification, EDI, and, if possible, CAD/CAM), support for R&D and new product 
development processes, and making the industry fully aware of  the nature of the challenge 
ahead and possible directions forward, can all play an important role in assisting the industry 
to enhance its competitiveness. 
54 However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the restructuring and improvements of the 
relationship between the levels of the value chain in the industry will be equally important to 
the efforts of the individual companies themselves.  The realisation of  true partnership 
relationships along the value chain is perhaps the critical challenge to create a viable and 
strong European automotive industry by the end of  the decade. 
* * * * * 
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